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Abstract
Algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities occur when the worst-
case time/space complexity of an application is signicantly
higher than the respective average case for particular user-
controlled inputs. When such conditions are met, an attacker
can launch Denial-of-Service attacks against a vulnerable ap-
plication by providing inputs that trigger the worst-case be-
havior. Such attacks have been known to have serious eects
on production systems, take down entire websites, or lead to
bypasses of Web Application Firewalls.
Unfortunately, existing detection mechanisms for algorith-
mic complexity vulnerabilities are domain-specic and often
require signicant manual eort. In this paper, we design,
implement, and evaluate SlowFuzz, a domain-independent
framework for automatically nding algorithmic complex-
ity vulnerabilities. SlowFuzz automatically nds inputs that
trigger worst-case algorithmic behavior in the tested binary.
SlowFuzz uses resource-usage-guided evolutionary search
techniques to automatically nd inputs that maximize compu-
tational resource utilization for a given application.
We demonstrate that SlowFuzz successfully generates in-
puts that match the theoretical worst-case performance for
several well-known algorithms. SlowFuzz was also able to
generate a large number of inputs that trigger dierent algo-
rithmic complexity vulnerabilities in real-world applications,
including various zip parsers used in antivirus software, regu-
lar expression libraries used in Web Application Firewalls, as
well as hash table implementations used in Web applications.
In particular, SlowFuzz generated inputs that achieve 300-
times slowdown in the decompression routine of the bzip2
utility, discovered regular expressions that exhibit matching
times exponential in the input size, and also managed to auto-
matically produce inputs that trigger a high number of colli-
sions in PHP’s default hashtable implementation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities result from large dif-
ferences between the worst-case and average-case time/space
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complexities of algorithms or data structures used by aected
software [31]. An attacker can exploit such vulnerabilities by
providing specially crafted inputs that trigger the worst-case
behavior in the victim software to launch Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks. For example, regular expression matching is
known to exhibit widely varying levels of time complexity
(from linear to exponential) on input string size depending on
the type of the regular expression and underlying implemen-
tation details. Similarly, the run times of hash table insertion
and lookup operations can dier signicantly if the hashtable
implementation suers from a large number of hash colli-
sions. Sorting algorithms like quicksort can have an O(nloдn)
average-case complexity but an O(n2) worst-case complexity.
Such worst-case behaviors have been known to take down
entire websites [22], disable/bypass Web Application Firewalls
(WAF) [6], or to keep thousands of CPUs busy by merely per-
forming hash-table insertions [19, 24].
Despite their potential severity, in practice, detecting algo-
rithmic complexity vulnerabilities in a domain-independent
way is a hard, multi-faceted problem. It is often infeasible to
completely abandon algorithms or data structures with high
worst-case complexities without severely restricting the func-
tionality or backwards-compatibility of an application. Manual
time complexity analysis of real-world applications is hard to
scale. Moreover, asymptotic complexity analysis ignores the
constant factors that can signicantly aect the application
execution time despite not impacting the overall complexity
class. All these factors signicantly harden the detection of
algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities.
Even when real-world applications use well-understood
algorithms, time complexity analysis is still non-trivial for the
following reasons. First, the time/space complexity analysis
changes signicantly even with minor implementation vari-
ations (for instance, the choice of the pivot in the quicksort
algorithm drastically aects its worst-case runtime behav-
ior [30]). Reasoning about the eects of such changes requires
signicant manual eort. Second, most real-world applications
often have multiple inter-connected components that interact
in complex ways. This interconnection further complicates
the estimation of the overall complexity, even when the time
complexity of the individual components is well understood.
Most existing detection mechanisms for algorithmic com-
plexity vulnerabilities use domain- and implementation-specic
heuristics or rules, e.g., detect excessive backtracking during
regular expression matching [5, 25]. However, such rules tend
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to be brittle and are hard to scale to a large number of di-
verse domains, since their creation and maintenance requires
signicant manual eort and expertise. Moreover, keeping
such rules up-to-date with newer software versions is onerous,
as even minor changes to the implementation might require
signicant changes in the rules.
In this work, we design, implement, and evaluate a novel
dynamic domain-independent approach for automatically nd-
ing inputs that trigger worst-case algorithmic complexity vul-
nerabilities in tested applications. In particular, we introduce
SlowFuzz, an evolutionary-search-based framework that can
automatically nd inputs to maximize resource utilization (in-
struction count, memory usage etc.) for a given test binary.
SlowFuzz is fully automated and does not require any man-
ual guidance or domain-specic rules. The key idea behind
SlowFuzz is that the problem of nding algorithmic complex-
ity vulnerabilities can be posed as an optimization problem
whose goal is to nd an input that maximizes resource uti-
lization of a target application. We develop an evolutionary
search technique specically designed to nd solutions for
this optimization problem.
We evaluate SlowFuzz on a variety of real world applica-
tions, including the PCRE library for regular expression match-
ing [18], the bzip2 compression/decompression utility, as well
as the hash table implementation of PHP. We demonstrate that
SlowFuzz can successfully generate inputs that trigger com-
plexity vulnerabilities in all the above contexts. Particularly,
we show that SlowFuzz generates inputs that achieve a 300-
times slowdown when decompressed by the bzip2 utility, can
produce regular expressions that exhibit matching times expo-
nential in the input’s size, and also manages to automatically
generate inputs that trigger a high number of collisions in
real-world PHP applications. We also demonstrate that our
evolutionary guidance scheme achieves more than 100% im-
provement over code coverage at steering input generation
towards triggering complexity vulnerabilities.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We present SlowFuzz, the rst, to the best of our knowl-
edge, domain-independent dynamic testing tool for auto-
matically nding algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities
without any manual guidance.
• We design an evolutionary guidance engine with novel
mutation schemes particularly tted towards generating
inputs that trigger worst-case resource usage behaviors in
a given application. Our scheme achieves more than 100%
improvement over code-coverage-guided input generation
at nding such inputs.
• We evaluate SlowFuzz on a variety of complex real-world
applications and demonstrate its ecacy at detecting com-
plexity vulnerabilities in diverse domains including large
real-world software like the bzip2 utility and the PCRE
regular expression library.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide
a high-level overview of SlowFuzz’s inner workings with a
motivating example in Section 2. We describe the details of our
methodology in Section 3. The implementation of SlowFuzz is
described in Section 4 and the evaluation results are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 outlines the limitations of our current
prototype and discusses possible future extensions. Finally, we
discuss related work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
2 OVERVIEW
2.1 Problem Description
In this paper, we detect algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities
in a given application by detecting inputs that cause large
variations in resource utilization through the number of ex-
ecuted instructions or CPU usage for all inputs of a given
size. We assume that our tool has gray-box access to the ap-
plication binary, i.e., it can instrument the binary in order to
harvest dierent ne-grained resource usage information from
multiple runs of the binary, with dierent inputs. Note that
our goal is not to estimate the asymptotic complexities of the
underlying algorithms or data structures of the application.
Instead, we measure the resource usage variation in some pre-
dened metric like the total edges accessed during a run, and
try to maximize that metric. Even though, in most cases, the
inputs causing worst-case behaviors under such metrics will
be the ones demonstrating the actual worst-case asymptotic
behaviors, but this may not always be true due to the constant
factors ignored in the asymptotic time complexity, the small
input sizes, etc.
Threat model. Our threat model assumes that an attacker
can provide arbitrary specially-crafted inputs to the vulner-
able software to trigger worst-case behaviors. This is a very
realistic threat-model as most non-trivial real-world software
like Web applications and regular expression matchers need
to deal with inputs from untrusted sources. For a subset of our
experiments involving regular expression matching, we as-
sume that attackers can control regular expressions provided
to the matchers. This is a valid assumption for a large set of
applications that provide search functionality through custom
regular expressions from untrusted users.
2.2 A Motivating Example
In order to understand how our technique works, let us con-
sider quicksort, one of the simplest yet most widely used sort-
ing algorithms. It is well-known [30] that quicksort has an
average time complexity ofO(nloдn) but a worst-case complex-
ity of O(n2) where n is the size of the input. However, nding
an actual input that demonstrates the worst-case behavior in
a particular quicksort implementation depends on low-level
details like the pivot selection mechanism. If an adversary
knows the actual pivot selection scheme used by the imple-
mentation, she can use domain-specic rules to nd an input
that will trigger the worst-case behavior (e.g., the quadratic
time complexity) [40].
However, in our setting, SlowFuzz does not know any
domain-specic rules. It also does not understand the seman-
tics of pivot selection or which part of the code implements the
pivot selection logic, even though it has access to the quicksort
implementation. We would still like SlowFuzz to generate
inputs that trigger the corresponding worst-case behavior and
identify the algorithmic complexity vulnerability.
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This brings us to the following research question: how
can SlowFuzz automatically generate inputs that would trig-
ger worst-case performance in a tested binary in a domain-
independent manner? The search space of all inputs is too
large to search exhaustively. Our key intuition in this paper is
that evolutionary search techniques can be used to iteratively
nd inputs that are closer to triggering the worst-case behav-
ior. Adopting an evolutionary testing approach, SlowFuzz
begins with a corpus of seed inputs, applies mutations to each
of the inputs in the corpus, and ranks each of the inputs based
on their resource usage patterns. SlowFuzz keeps the highest
ranked inputs for further mutations in upcoming generations.
To further illustrate this point, let us consider the pseu-
docode of Figure 1, depicting a quicksort example with a sim-
ple pivot selection scheme—the rst element of the array being
selected as the pivot. In this case, the worst-case behavior can
be elicited by an already sorted array. Let us also assume that
SlowFuzz’s initial corpus consists of some arrays of numbers
and that none of them are completely sorted. Executing this
quicksort implementation with the seed arrays will result in a
dierent number of statements/instructions executed based on
how close each of these arrays are to being sorted. SlowFuzz
will assign a score to each of these inputs based on the number
of statements executed by the quicksort implementation for
each of the inputs. The inputs resulting in the highest number
of executed statements will be selected for further mutation
to create the next generation of inputs. Therefore, each up-
coming generation will have inputs that are closer to being
completely sorted than the inputs of the previous generations.
For example, let us assume the initial corpus for SlowFuzz
consists of a single array I = [8, 5, 3, 7, 9]. At each step, Slow-
Fuzz picks at random an input from the corpus, mutates it,
and passes the mutated input to the above quicksort imple-
mentation while recording the number of executed statements.
As shown in Figure 1, the input [8, 5, 3, 7, 9] results in the
execution of 37 lines of code (LOC). Let us assume that this
input is mutated into [1, 5, 3, 7, 9] that causes the execution
of 52 LOC which is higher than the original input and there-
fore [1, 5, 3, 7, 9] is selected for further mutation. Eventually,
SlowFuzz will nd a completely sorted array (e.g., [1, 5, 6, 7,
9] as shown in Figure 1) that will demonstrate the worst-case
quadratic behavior. We provide a more thorough analysis of
SlowFuzz’s performance on various sorting implementations
in Section 5.2.
3 METHODOLOGY
The key observation for our methodology is that evolutionary
search techniques together with dynamic analysis present a
promising approach for nding inputs that demonstrate worst-
case complexity of a test application in a domain-independent
way. However, to enable SlowFuzz to eciently nd such
inputs, we need to carefully design eective guidance mecha-
nisms and mutation schemes to drive SlowFuzz’s input gen-
eration process. We design a new evolutionary algorithm with
customized guidance mechanisms and mutation schemes that
are tailored for nding inputs causing worst-case behavior.
Algorithm 1 shows the core evolutionary engine of Slow-
Fuzz. Initially, SlowFuzz randomly selects an input to execute
1 function quicksort(array):
2 /* initialize three arrays to hold
3 elements smaller , equal and greater
4 than the pivot */
5 smaller , equal , greater = [], [], []
6 if len(array) <= 1:
7 return
8 pivot = array [0]
9 for x in array:
10 if x > pivot:
11 greater.append(x)
12 else if x == pivot:
13 equal.append(x)
14 else if x < pivot:
15 smaller.append(x)
16 quicksort(greater)
17 quicksort(smaller)
18 array = concat(smaller , equal , greater)
Quicksort Inputs
8 5 3 7 9
1 5 3 7 9
1 5 6 7 9
…
Number of 
executed 
lines
37
52
67
Figure 1: Pseudocode for quicksort with a simple
pivot selectionmechanism and overview of SlowFuzz’s
evolutionary search process for nding inputs that
demonstrateworst-case quadratic time complexity. The
shaded boxes indicate mutated inputs.
from a given seed corpus (line 4), which is mutated (line 5)
and passed as input to the test application (line 6). During
an execution, proling info such as the dierent types of re-
source usage of the application are recorded (lines 6-8). An
input is scored based on its resource usage and is added to the
mutation corpus if the input is deemed as a slow unit (lines
9-12).
In the following Sections, we describe the core components
of SlowFuzz’s engine, particularly the tness function used to
determine whether an input is a slow unit or not, and the oset
and type of mutations performed on each of the individual
inputs in the corpus.
3.1 Fitness Functions
As shown in Algorithm 1, SlowFuzz determines, after each
execution, whether the executed unit should be considered
for further mutations (lines 9-12). SlowFuzz ranks the cur-
rent inputs based on the scores assigned to them by a tness
function and keeps the ttest ones for further mutation. Popu-
lar coverage-based tness functions which are often used by
evolutionary fuzzers to detect crashes, are not well suited for
our purpose as they do not consider loop iterations which are
crucial for detecting worst-case time complexity.
SlowFuzz’s input generation is guided by a tness function
based on resource usage. Such a tness function is generic and
can take into consideration dierent kinds of resource usage
like CPU usage, energy, memory, etc. In order to measure the
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Algorithm 1 SlowFuzz: Report all slow units for application
A after n generations, starting from a corpus I
1: procedure DiffTest(I, A, n, GlobalState)
2: units = ∅ ;reported slowunits
3: while дeneration ≤ n and I , ∅ do
4: input = RandomChoice(I)
5: mut_input =Mutate(input )
6: app_insn,app_outputs = Run(A,mut_input )
7: дen_insn ∪ = {app_insn}
8: дen_usaдe ∪ = {app_usaдe}
9: if SlowUnit(дen_insn,дen_usaдe ,
GlobalState) then
10: I ← I ∪mut_input
11: units ∪ =mut_input
12: end if
13: дeneration = дeneration + 1
14: end while
15: return units
16: end procedure
CPU usage in a ne-grained way, SlowFuzz’s tness func-
tion keeps track of the total count of all instructions executed
during a run of a test program. The intuition is that the test pro-
gram becomes slower as the number of executed instructions
increases. Therefore, the tness function selects the inputs
that result in the highest number of executed instructions as
the slowest units. For eciency, we monitor execution at the
basic-block level instead of instructions while counting the
total number of executed instructions for a program. We found
that this method is more eective at guiding input generation
than directly using the time taken by the test program to run.
The runtime of a program shows large variations, depending
on the application’s concurrency characteristics or other pro-
grams that are executing in the same CPU, and therefore is
not a reliable indicator for small increases in CPU usage.
3.2 Mutation Strategy
SlowFuzz introduces several new mutation strategies tailored
to identify inputs that demonstrate the worst-case complexity
of a program. A mutation strategy decides which mutation
operations to apply and which byte osets in an input to
modify, to generate a new mutated input (Algorithm 1, line 5).
SlowFuzz supports the following mutation operations: (i)
add/remove a new/existing byte from the input; ii) randomly
modify a bit/byte in the input; iii) randomly change the order of
a subset of the input bytes; iv) randomly change bytes whose
values are within the range of ASCII codes for digits (i.e.,
0x30-0x39); v) perform a crossover operation in a given buer
mixing dierent parts of the input; and vi) mutate bytes solely
using characters or strings from a user-provided dictionary.
We describe the dierent mutation strategies supported by
SlowFuzz below. Section 5.6 presents a detailed performance
comparison of these strategies.
RandomMutations. Random mutations are the simplest mu-
tation strategy supported by SlowFuzz. Under this mutation
strategy, one of the aforementioned mutations is selected at
random and is applied on an input, as long as it does not vi-
olate other constraints for the given testing session, such as
exceeding the maximum input length specied by the auditor.
This strategy is similar to the ones used by popular evolution-
ary fuzzers like AFL [58] and libFuzzer [14] for nding crashes
or memory safety issues.
Mutation priority. Under this strategy, the mutation oper-
ation is selected with ϵ probability based on its success at
producing slow units during previous executions. The muta-
tion operation is picked at random with (1 − ϵ) probability. In
contrast, the mutation oset is still selected at random just
like the strategy described above.
In particular, during testing, we count all the cases in which
a mutation operation resulted in an increase in the observed
instruction count and the number of times that operation has
been selected. Based on these values, we assign a score to each
mutation operation denoting the probability of the mutation to
be successful at increasing the instruction count. For example,
a score of 0 denotes that the mutation operation has never
resulted in an increase in the number of executed instructions,
whereas a score of 1 denotes that the mutation always resulted
in an increase.
We pick the highest-scoring mutation among all mutation
operations with a probability ϵ . The tunable parameter ϵ de-
termines how often a mutation operation will be selected at
random versus based on its score. Essentially, dierent val-
ues of ϵ provide dierent trade-os between exploration and
exploitation. In SlowFuzz, we set the default value of ϵ to 0.5.
Oset priority. This strategy selects the mutation operation
to be applied randomly at each step, but the oset to be mu-
tated is selected based on prior history of success at increasing
the number of executed instructions. The mutation oset is
selected based on the results of previous executions with a
probability ϵ and at random with a probability (1 − ϵ). In the
rst case, we select the oset that showed the most promise
based on previous executions (each oset is given a score rang-
ing from 0 to 1 denoting the percentage of times in which the
mutation of that oset led to an increase in the number of
instructions).
Hybrid. In this last mode of operation we apply a combination
of both mutation and oset priority as described above. For
each oset, we maintain an array of probabilities of success
for each of the mutation operations that are being performed.
Instead of maintaining a coarse-grained success probability
for each mutation in the mutation priority strategy, we main-
tain ne-grained success probabilities for each oset/mutation
operation pairs. We compute the score of each oset by com-
puting the average of success probabilities of all mutation
operations at that oset. During each mutation, with a proba-
bility of ϵ , we pick the oset and operation with the highest
scores. The mutation oset and operation are also picked ran-
domly with a probability of (1 − ϵ).
4 IMPLEMENTATION
The SlowFuzz prototype is built on top of libFuzzer [14], a
popular evolutionary fuzzer for nding crash and memory
safety bugs. We outline the implementation details of dierent
components of SlowFuzz below. Overall, our modications
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Figure 2: SlowFuzz architecture.
to libFuzzer consist of 550 lines of C++ code. We used Clang
v4.0 for compiling our modications along with the rest of
libFuzzer code.
Figure 2 shows SlowFuzz’s high-level architecture. Sim-
ilar to the popular evolutionary fuzzers like AFL [58] and
libFuzzer [14], SlowFuzz executes in the same address space
as the application being tested. We instrument the test appli-
cation so that SlowFuzz can have access to dierent resource
usage metrics (e.g, number of instructions executed) needed for
its analysis. The instrumented test application subsequently
is executed under the control of SlowFuzz’s analysis engine.
SlowFuzz maintains an active corpus of inputs to be passed
into the tested applications and renes the corpus during exe-
cution based on SlowFuzz’s tness function. For each genera-
tion, an input is selected, mutated, then passed into the main
routine of the application for its execution.
Instrumentation. Similar to libFuzzer, SlowFuzz’s instru-
mentation is based on Clang’s SanitizerCoverage [21] passes.
Particularly, SanitizerCoverage allows tracking of each ex-
ecuted function, basic block, and edge in the Control Flow
Graph (CFG). It also allows us to register callbacks for each
of these events. SlowFuzz makes use of SanitizerCoverage’s
eight bit counter capability that maps each Control Flow Graph
(CFG) edge into an eight bit counter representing the number
of times that edge was accessed during an execution. We use
the counter to keep track of the following ranges: 1, 2, 3, 4-7,
8-15, 16-31, 32-127, 128+. This provides a balance between
accuracy of the counts and the overhead incurred for main-
taining them. This information is then passed into SlowFuzz’s
tness function, which determines whether an input is slow
enough to keep for the next generation of mutations.
Mutations. LibFuzzer provides API support for custom in-
put mutations. However, in order to implement the mutation
strategies proposed in Section 3.2, we had to modify libFuzzer
internals. Particularly, we augment the functions used in lib-
Fuzzer’s Mutator class to return information on the mutation
operation, oset, and the range of aected bytes for each new
input generated by LibFuzzer. This information is used to com-
pute the scores necessary for supporting mutation piority,
oset priority, and hybrid modes as described in Section 3.2
without any additional runtime overhead.
5 EVALUATION
In this Section, we evaluate SlowFuzz on the following objec-
tives: a) Is SlowFuzz capable of generating inputs that match
the theoretical worst-case complexity for a given algorithm’s
implementation? b) Is SlowFuzz capable of eciently nd-
ing inputs that cause performance slowdowns in real-world
applications? c) How do the dierent mutation and guidance
engines of SlowFuzz aect its performance? d) How does
SlowFuzz compare with code-coverage-guided search at nd-
ing inputs demonstrating worst-case application behavior?
We describe the detailed results of our evaluation in the
following Sections. All our experiments were performed on
a machine with 23GB of RAM, equipped with an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU X5550 @ 2.67GHz and running 64-bit Debian
8 (jessie), compiled with GCC version 4.9.2, with a kernel
version 4.5.0. All binaries were compiled using the Clang-4.0
compiler toolchain. All instruction counts and execution times
are measured using the Linux perf proler v3.16, averaging
over 10 repetitions for each perf execution.
5.1 Overview
In order to adequately address the questions outlined in the
previous Section, we execute SlowFuzz on applications of
dierent algorithmic proles and evaluate its ability of gener-
ating inputs that demonstrate worst case behavior.
First, we examine if SlowFuzz generates inputs that demon-
strate the theoretical worst-case behavior of well-known al-
gorithms. We apply SlowFuzz on sorting algorithms with
well-known complexities. The results are presented in Sec-
tion 5.2. Subsequently, we apply SlowFuzz on dierent appli-
cations and algorithms that have been known to be vulnerable
to complexity attacks: the PCRE regular expression library,
the default hash table implementation of PHP, and the bzip2
binary. In all cases, we demonstrate that SlowFuzz is able to
trigger complexity vulnerabilities. Table 1 shows a summary
of our ndings.
Tested Application Fuzzing Outcome
Insertion sort [30] 41.59x slowdown
Quicksort (Fig 1) 5.12x slowdown
Apple quicksort 3.34x slowdown
OpenBSD quicksort 3.30x slowdown
NetBSD quicksort 8.7% slowdown
GNU quicksort 26.36% slowdown
PCRE (xed input) 78 exponential &
765 superlinear regexes
PCRE (xed regex) 8% - 25% slowdown
PHP hashtable 20 collisions in 64 keys
bzip2 decompression ~300x slowdown
Table 1: Result Summary
As shown in Table 1, SlowFuzz is successful at inducing
signicant slowdown on all tested applications. Moreover,
when applied to the PCRE library, it managed to generate
regular expressions that exhibit exponential and super-linear
(worse than quadratic) matching automatically, without any
knowledge of the structure of a regular expression. Likewise,
it successfully generated inputs that induce a high number of
collisions when inserted into a PHP hash table, without any
notion of hash functions. In the following Sections, we provide
details on each of the above test settings.
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5.2 Sorting
Simple quicksort and insertion sort. Our rst evaluation
of SlowFuzz’s consistency with theoretical results is per-
formed on common sorting algorithms with well-known worst-
performing inputs. To this end, we initially apply SlowFuzz
on an implementation of the insertion sort algorithm [30], as
well as on an implementation of quicksort [30] in which the
rst sub-array element is always selected as the pivot. Both of
the above implementations demonstrate quadratic complexity
when the input passed to them is sorted. We run SlowFuzz
for 1 million generations on the above implementations, sort-
ing a le with a size of 64 bytes, and examine the slowdown
SlowFuzz introduced over the fastest unit seen during testing.
To do so, we count the total instructions executed by each
program for each of the inputs, subtracting all instructions
not relevant to the quicksort functionality (e.g., loader code).
Our results are presented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Best slowdown achieved by SlowFuzz at each
generation (normalized over the slowdown of the best-
performing input) versus best random testing outcome,
on our insertion sort and quicksort drivers, for an in-
put size of 64 bytes (average of 100 runs). The SlowFuzz
achieves slowdowns of 84.97% and 83.74% compared to
the theoretical worst cases for insertion sort and quick-
sort respectively.
Figure 3 represents an average of 100 runs. In each run,
SlowFuzz started execution with a single random 64 byte
seed, and executed for 1 million generations. We notice that
SlowFuzz achieves 41.59x and 5.12x slowdowns for insertion
sort and quicksort respectively. In order to examine how this
behavior compares to random testing, we randomly generated
1 million inputs of 64 bytes each and measured the instruc-
tions required for insertion sort and quicksort, respectively.
Figure 3 depicts the maximum slowdown achieved through
random testing across all runs. We notice that in both cases
SlowFuzz outperforms the brute-force worst-input estimation.
Finally, we observe that the gap between brute-force search
and SlowFuzz is much higher for quicksort than insertion,
which is consistent with the fact that average case complexity
of insertion sort is O(n2), compared to quicksort’s O(nloдn).
Therefore, a random input is more likely to demonstrate worst-
case behavior for insertion sort but not for quicksort.
Real-world quicksort implementations. We also exam-
ined how SlowFuzz performs when applied to real-world
quicksort implementations. Particularly, we applied it to the
Apple [12], GNU [9], NetBSD [15], and OpenBSD [13] quick-
sort implementations. We notice that SlowFuzz’s performance
on real world implementations is consistent with the quicksort
performance that we observed in the experiments described
above. In particular, the slowdowns generated by SlowFuzz
were (in increasing order) 8.7%, for theNetBSD implementa-
tion, 26.36% for the GNU quicksort implementation, 3.30x for
the OpenBSD implementation and 3.34x for the Apple imple-
mentation. We notice that, despite the fact these implemen-
tations use ecient pivot selection strategies, SlowFuzz still
manages to trigger signicant slowdowns. On the contrary,
repeating the same experiment using naive coverage-based
fuzzing yields slowdowns that never surpass 5% for any of the
libraries. This is an expected result, as coverage-based fuzzers
are geared towards maximizing coverage, and thus do not fa-
vor inputs exercising the same edges repeatedly over inputs
that discover new edges.
Finally, we note that, similar to the experiment of Figure 3,
the slowdowns for Figure 4 are also measured in terms of
executed instructions, normalized over the instructions of the
best performing input seen during testing.
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Figure 4: Best slowdown (with respect to the best-
performing input) achieved by SlowFuzz at each gener-
ation normalized over the best random testing outcome,
on real-world quicksort implementations, for an input
size of 64 bytes (average of 100 runs).
Result 1: SlowFuzz was able to generate inputs for
quicksort and insertion sort that achieve 83.74% and
84.97% of the theoretical worst-case, respectively with-
out any information on the algorithm internals.
5.3 Regular Expressions
Regular expression implementations are known to be suscep-
tible to complexity attacks [17, 20, 24]. In particular, there are
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over 150 Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vul-
nerabilities registered in the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD), which are the result of exponential (e.g., [8]) or super-
linear (worse than quadratic) e.g., [7] complexity of regular
expression matching by several existing matchers [57].
Even performing domain-specic analyses of whether an
application is susceptible to ReDoS attacks is non-trivial. Sev-
eral works are solely dedicated to the detection of exploitation
of such vulnerabilities. Recently, Rexploiter [57] presented
algorithms to detect whether a given regular expression may
result in non-deterministic nite automata (NFA) that require
super-linear or exponential matching times for specially crafted
inputs. They have also presented domain-specic algorithms
to generate inputs capable of triggering such worst-case per-
formance. The above denote the hardness of SlowFuzz’s task,
namely nding regular expressions that may result in super-
linear or exponential matching times without any domain
knowledge.
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Figure 5: Probability of SlowFuzz nding at least n
unique instances of regexes that cause a slowdown, or
exhibit super-linear and exponential matching times,
after 1million generations (inverse CDF over 100 runs).
For the regular expression setting we perform two separate
experiments to check whether SlowFuzz can produce i) reg-
ular expressions which exhibit super-linear and exponential
matching times, ii) inputs that cause slowdown during match-
ing, given a xed regular expression. To this end, we apply
SlowFuzz on the PCRE regular expression library [18] and
provide it with a character set of the symbols used in PCRE-
compliant regular expressions (in the form of a dictionary).
Notice that we do not further guide SlowFuzz with respect to
what mutations should be done and SlowFuzz’s engine is com-
pletely agnostic of the structure of a valid regular expression.
In all cases, we start testing from an empty corpus without
providing any seeds of regular expressions to SlowFuzz.
Fixed string and mutated regular expressions. For the
rst part of our evaluation, we apply SlowFuzz on a binary
that utilizes the PCRE library to perform regular expression
matching and we let SlowFuzz mutate the regular expression
part of the pcre2_match call used for the matching, using
a dictionary of regular expression characters. The input to
be matched against the regular expression is selected from
a random pool of characters and SlowFuzz executes for a
total of 1 million generations, or until a time-out is hit. The
regular expressions generated by SlowFuzz are kept limited
to 10 characters or less. Once a SlowFuzz session ends, we
evaluate the time complexity of the generated regular expres-
sions utilizing Rexploiter [57], which detects if the regular
expression is super-linear, exponential, or none of the two. We
repeat the above process for a total of 100 fuzzing sessions.
Overall, SlowFuzz generates a total of 33343 regular expres-
sions during the above 100 sessions, out of which 27142 are
rejected as invalid whereas 6201 are valid regular expressions
that caused a slowdown. Out of the valid regular expressions,
765 are superlinear and 78 are exponential. This experiment
demonstrates that despite being agnostic of the semantics of
regex matching, SlowFuzz successfully generates regexes re-
quiring super-linear and exponential matching times. Six such
examples are presented in Table 2.
Super-linear (greater than quadratic) Exponential
c*ca*b*a*b (b+)+c
a+b+b+b+a+ c*(b+b)+c
c*c+ccbc+ a(a|a*)+a
Table 2: Sample regexes generated by SlowFuzz result-
ing in super-linear (greater than quadratic) and expo-
nential matching complexity.
A detailed case study. The regexes presented in Table 2 are
typical examples of regular expressions that require non-linear
matching running times. This happens due to the existence
of dierent paths in the respective NFAs, which reach the
same state through an identical sequence of labels. Such paths
have a devastating eect during backtracking [57]. To further
elaborate on this property, let us consider the NFA depicted in
Figure 6, which corresponds to the regular expression (b+)+c
of Table 2.
q0 q1 q2
b
b
b
c
Figure 6: NFA for the regular expression (b+)+c suer-
ing from exponential matching complexity as found by
SlowFuzz. q0 is the entry state, q2 the accept state, and
q1 the pivot state for the exponential backtracking.
We notice that, for the NFA shown in Figure 6, starting
from state q1, it is possible to reach q1 again, through two
dierent paths, namely the paths (q1 b−→ q0,q0 b−→ q1) and
(q1 b−→ q1,q1 b−→ q1). Moreover, we notice that the labels in
the transitions for both of the above paths are the same: ’bb’
is consumed in both cases. Thus, as it is possible to reach q2
from q1 (via label c) as well as reach q1 from the initial state
q0, there will be an exponentially large number of paths to
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consider in the case of backtracking. Similar issues arise with
loops appearing in NFAs with super-linear matching [57].
As mentioned above, on average, among the valid regular
expressions generated by SlowFuzz, approximately 12.33% of
the regexes have super-linear matching complexity, whereas
2.29% on average have exponential matching complexity. The
aforementioned results are aggregates across all the 100 exe-
cutions of the experiment. In order to estimate the probability
of SlowFuzz to generate a regex that exhibits a slowdown 1,
or super-linear and exponential matching times in a single ses-
sion, we calculate the respective inverse CDF which is shown
in Figure 5. We notice that, for all the regular expressions ob-
served, SlowFuzz successfully generates inputs that incur a
slowdown during matching. In particular, with 90% probability,
SlowFuzz generates at least 2 regular expressions requiring
super-linear matching time and at least 31 regular expressions
that cause a slowdown. SlowFuzz generates at least one regex
requiring exponential matching time with a probability of
45.45% .
Fixed regular expression and mutated string. In the sec-
ond part of our evaluation of SlowFuzz on regular expres-
sions, we seek to examine if, for a given xed regular expres-
sion, SlowFuzz is able to generate inputs that can introduce
a slowdown during matching. We collect PCRE-compliant
regular expressions from popular Web Application Firewalls
(WAF) [2], and utilized the PCRE library to match input strings
generated by SlowFuzz against each regular expression. For
this experiment, we apply SlowFuzz on a total of 25 regular
expressions, and we record the total instructions executed
by the PCRE library when matching the regular expression
against SlowFuzz’s generated units, at each generation. For
our set of regular expressions, SlowFuzz achieved monotoni-
cally increasing slowdowns, ranging from 8% to 25%. Figure 7
presents how the slowdown varies as fuzzing progresses, for
three representative regex samples with dierent slowdown
patterns.
5.4 Hash Tables
Hash tables are a core data structure in a wide variety of soft-
ware. The performance of hash table lookup and insertion
operations signicantly aects the overall application perfor-
mance. Complexity attacks against hash table implementa-
tions may induce unwanted eects ranging from performance
slowdowns to full-edged DoS [8, 17, 19, 20, 24]. In order to
evaluate if SlowFuzz can generate inputs that trigger colli-
sions without knowing any details about the underlying hash
functions, we apply it on the hash table implementation of
PHP (v5.6.26), which is known to be vulnerable to collision
attacks.
PHP Hashtables. Hashtables are prevalent in PHP and they
also serve as the backbone for PHP’s array interface. PHP v5.x
utilizes the DJBX33A hash function for hashing using string
keys, which can bee seen in Listing 1.
We notice that for two strings of the form ‘ab’ and ‘cd’ to
collide, the following property must hold [10]:
c = a + n ∧ d = b − 33 ∗ n,n ∈ Z
1Notice that due to SlowFuzz’s guidance engine, any regex produced must
exhibit increased instruction count as compared to all previous regexes.
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Figure 7: Best slowdown achieved by SlowFuzz-
generated input strings (normalized over the slowdown
of the best-performing input), when matching against
xed regular expressions used in WAFs (normalized
against best performing input over an average of
100 runs). The corresponding regexes are listed in
Appendix A.
It is also easy to show that if two equal-length strings A and B
collide, then strings xAy, xBy where x and y are any prex and
sux respectively, also collide. Using the above property, one
can construct a worst-case performing sequence of inputs [3],
forcing a worst-case insertion time of O(n2).
1 /*
2 * @arKey is the array key to be hashed
3 * @nKeyLenth is the length of arKey
4 */
5 static inline ulong
6 zend_inline_hash_func(const char *arKey , uint
nKeyLength)
7 {
8 register ulong hash = 5381;
9
10 for (uint i = 0; i < nKeyLength; ++i) {
11 hash = ((hash << 5) + hash) + arKey[i];
12 }
13
14 return hash;
15 }
Listing 1: DJBX33A hash without loop unrolling.
Abusing the complexity characteristics of the BJBX33A hash,
attackers performed DoS attacks against PHP, Python and
Ruby applications in 2011. As a response, PHP added an op-
tion in its ini conguration to set a limit on the number of
collisions that are allowed to happen. However, in 2015, similar
DoS attacks [1] were reported, abusing PHP’s JSON parsing
into hash tables. In this experiment we examine how Slow-
Fuzz performs when applied to this particular hash function
implementation.
Our experimental setup is as follows: we ported the PHP
hash table implementation so that the latter can be used in any
C/C++ implementation, removing all the interpreter-specic
variables and macros, however leaving all the non interpreter-
related components intact. Subsequently, we created a hash
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Figure 8: Number of collisions found by SlowFuzz per
generation, when applying it on the PHP 5.6 hashtable
impelemntation, for atmost of 64 insertionswith string
keys.
table with a size of 64 entries, and utilized SlowFuzz to per-
form a maximum of 64 insertions to the hash table, using
strings as keys, starting from a corpus consisting of a single
input that causes 8 collisions. In particular, the keys for the
hash table insertions were provided by SlowFuzz at each gen-
eration and SlowFuzz evolved its corpus of strings using a
hybrid mutation strategy. Given a hash table of 64 entries and
64 insertions to the hash table, the maximum number of col-
lisions that can be performed is also 64. In order to measure
the number of collisions occurring in the hashtable at each
generation, we created a PHP module (running in the context
of PHP), and measured the number of collisions induced by
each input that SlowFuzz generates. We perform our mea-
surements after the respective elements are inserted into a
real PHP array. Our results are presented in Figure 8.
We notice that despite the complex conditions required to
trigger a hash collision and without knowing any details about
the hash function, SlowFuzz’s evolutionary engine reaches
31.25% of the theoretical worst-case after approximately 40
hours of fuzzing, using a single CPU. SlowFuzz’s stateful, evo-
lutionary guidance achieves monotonically increasing slow-
downs, despite the complex constraints imposed by the hash
function. On the contrary, repeating the same experiment
using coverage-based fuzzing, yielded non-monotonically in-
creasing collisions, and at no point an input was generated
causing more than 8 collisions. In particular, fuzzing using
coverage generated 58 inputs with a median of 5 collisions.
5.5 ZIP Utilities
Zip utilities that support various compression/decompression
schemes are another instance of applications that have been
shown to suer from Denial of Service attacks. For instance,
an algorithmic complexity vulnerability used in the sorting
algorithms in the bzip2 application 2 allowed remote attackers
2The vulnerability is found in BZip2CompressorOutputStream for Apache
Commons Compress before 1.4.1
to cause DoS via increased CPU consumption, when they
provided a le with many repeating inputs [16].
In order to evaluate how SlowFuzz performs when applied
to the compression/decompression libraries, we apply it on
bzip2 v1.0.6. In particular, we utilize SlowFuzz to create com-
pressed les of a maximum of 250 bytes, and we subsequently
use the libbzip2 library to decompress them. Based on the slow-
downs observed during decompression, SlowFuzz evolves its
input corpus, mutating each input using its hybrid mode of
operation. Our experimental results are presented in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Slowdowns observed while decompressing in-
puts generated by SlowFuzz using the bzip2 binary.
The maximum le size is set to 250 bytes.
A detailed case study. Figure 9 depicts the time required by
the bzip2 binary to decompress each of the inputs generated
by SlowFuzz. We notice that for the rst hour of fuzzing, the
inputs generated by SlowFuzz do not exhibit signicant slow-
down during their decompression by bzip2. In particular, each
of the 250-byte inputs of SlowFuzz’s corpus for the rst hour
of fuzzing is decompressed in approximately 0.0006 seconds.
However, in upcoming generations, we observe that SlowFuzz
successfully achieves decompression times reaching 0.18s to
0.21s and an overall slowdown in the range of 300x. Partic-
ularly, in the rst 6 minutes after the rst hour, SlowFuzz
achieves a decompression time of 0.10 sec. This rst peak in
the decompression time is achieved because of SlowFuzz trig-
gering the randomization mechanism of bzip2, by setting the
respective header byte to a non-zero value. This mechanism,
although deprecated, was put in place to protect against repet-
itive blocks, and is still supported for legacy reasons. However,
even greater slowdowns are achieved when SlowFuzzmutates
two bytes used in bzip2’s Move to Front Transform (MTF) [4]
and particularly in the run length encoding of the MTF result.
Specically, the mutation of these bytes aects the total num-
ber of invocations of the BZ2_bzDecompress routine, which
results in a total slowdown of 38.31x in decompression time.
The respective code snippet in which the aected bytes
are read is shown in Listing 2: the GET_MTF_VAL macro reads
the modied bytes in memory 3. These bytes subsequently
3Via the macros GET_BITS(BZ_X_MTF_3, zvec, zn) and
GET_BIT(BZ_X_MTF_4, zj)
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cause the routine BZ2_bzDecompress to be called 4845 times,
contrary to a single call before the mutation. We should note
at this point, that the total size of the input before and after
the mutation remained unchanged.
Finally, in order to compare with a non complexity-targeting
strategy, we repeated the previous experiment using tradi-
tional coverage-based fuzzing. The fuzzer, when guided only
based on coverage, did not generate any input causing execu-
tions larger than 0.0008 seconds, with the maximum slowdown
achieved being 23.7%.
1 do {
2 /* Check that N doesn 't get too big , so that
3 es doesn't go negative. The maximum value
4 that can be RUNA/RUNB encoded is equal
5 to the block size (post the initial RLE),
6 viz , 900k, so bounding N at 2 million
7 should guard against overflow without
8 rejecting any legitimate inputs. */
9 if (N >= 2*1024*1024) RETURN(BZ_DATA_ERROR);
10 if (nextSym == BZ_RUNA) es = es + (0+1) * N;
else
11 if (nextSym == BZ_RUNB) es = es + (1+1) * N;
12 N = N * 2;
13 GET_MTF_VAL(BZ_X_MTF_3 , BZ_X_MTF_4 , nextSym);
14 }
15 while (nextSym == BZ_RUNA || nextSym ==
BZ_RUNB);
Listing 2: Excerpt from bzip2’s BZ2_decompress
routine (decompress.c). A two byte modication by
SlowFuzz results in a 38.31x slowdown compared to
the previous input.
From the above experiment we observe that SlowFuzz’s
guidance and mutations engines are successful in pinpointing
locations that trigger large slowdowns even in very complex
applications such as a state-of-the-art compression utility like
bzip2.
Result 2: SlowFuzz is capable of exposing complex-
ity vulnerabilities (e.g., 300x slowdown in bzip2, PCRE-
compliant regular expressions with exponential match-
ing time, and PHP hash table collisions) in real-world,
non-trivial applications without knowing any domain-
specic details.
5.6 Engine Evaluation
Eect of SlowFuzz’s tness function. In this section, we
examine the eect of using code-coverage-guided search ver-
sus SlowFuzz’s resource usage based tness function, particu-
larly in the context of scanning an application for complexity
vulnerabilities. To do so, we repeat one of the experiments of
Section 5.2, applying SlowFuzz on the OpenBSD quicksort
implementation with an input size of 64 bytes, for a total of
1 million generations, using hybrid mutations. Our results
are presented in Figure 10. We observe that SlowFuzz’s guid-
ance mechanism yields signicant improvement over code-
coverage-guided search. In particular, SlowFuzz achieves a
3.3x slowdown for OpenBSD, whereas the respective slow-
down achieved using only coverage-guided search is 23.41%.
This is an expected result, since, as mentioned in previous
Sections, code coverage cannot encapsulate behaviors result-
ing in multiple invocations of the same line of code (e.g., an
innite loop). Moreover, we notice that the total instructions
of each unit that is created by SlowFuzz at dierent gener-
ations is not monotonically increasing. This is an artifact of
our implementation, using SanitizerCoverage’s 8-bit counters,
which provide a coarse-grained, imprecise tracking of the real
number of times each edge was invoked (Section 4). Thus, al-
though a unit might result in execution of fewer instructions,
it will only be observed by SlowFuzz’s guidance engine if
the respective number of total CFG edges falls into a separate
bucket (8 possible ranges representing the total number of
CFG edge accesses). Future work can consider applying more
precise instruction tracking (e.g., using hardware counters or
utilities similar to perf) with static analyses passes, to achieve
more eective guidance.
Finally, when choosing the SlowFuzz tness function, we
also considered the option of utilizing time-based tracking
instead of performance counters. However, performing time-
based measurements in real-world systems is not trivial, es-
pecially at instruction-level granularity and when multiple
samples are required in order to minimize measurement er-
rors. In the context of fuzzing, multiple runs of the same input
will slow the fuzzer down signicantly. To demonstrate this
point, in Figure 10, we also include an experiment in which
the execution time of an input is used to guide input gener-
ation. In particular, we utilized CPU clock time to measure
the execution time of a unit and discarded the unit if it was
not slower than all previously seen units. We notice that the
corpus degrades due to system noise and does not achieve any
slowdown larger than 23%. 4
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Figure 10: Comparison of the slowdown achieved by
SlowFuzz under dierent guidance mechanisms, when
applied on the OpenBSD quicksort implementation of
Section 5.2, for an input size of 64 bytes, after 1 million
generations (average of 100 runs).
4Contrary to the slowdowns measured during fuzzing using a single run, the
slowdowns presented in Figure 10 are generated using the perf utility running
ten iterations per input. Non-monotonic increases denote corpus degradation
due to bad input selection.
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Result 3: SlowFuzz’s tness function and mutation
schemes outperform code-coverage-guided evolutionary
search by more than 100%.
Eect ofMutation Schemes. To highlight the dierent char-
acteristics of each of SlowFuzz’s mutation schemes described
in Section 3, we repeat one of the experiments of Section 5.2,
applying SlowFuzz on the OpenBSD quicksort, each time us-
ing a dierent mutation strategy. Our experimental setup is
identical with that of Section 5.2: we sort inputs with a size of
64 bytes and fuzz for a total of 1 million generations. For each
mode of operation, we average on a total of 100 SlowFuzz
sessions. Our results are presented in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Comparison of the best slowdown achieved
by SlowFuzz’s dierent mutation schemes, at each gen-
eration, when applied on theOpenBSD quicksort imple-
mentation of Section 5.2, for an input size of 64 bytes,
after 1 million generations (average of 100 runs).
We notice that, for the above experiment, choosing a mu-
tation at random, is the worst performing option among all
mutation options supported by SlowFuzz (Section 3.2), how-
ever still achieving a slowdown of 2.33x over the best perform-
ing input. Indeed, all of SlowFuzz’s scoring-based mutation
engines (oset-priority, mutation-priority and hybrid), are
expected to perform at least as good as selecting mutations
at random, given enough generations, as they avoid getting
stuck with unproductive mutations. We also observe that o-
set priority is the fastest mode to converge out of the other
mutation schemes for this particular experiment, and results
in an overall slowdown of 3.27x.
For sorting, osets that correspond to areas of the array that
should not be mutated, are quickly penalized under the oset
priority scheme, thus mutations are mainly performed on the
non-sorted portions of the array. Additionally, we observe that
mutation priority also outperforms the random scheme due to
the fact that certain mutations (e.g., crossover operations) may
have devastating eects on the sorting of the array. The muta-
tion priority scheme picks up such patterns and avoids such
mutations. By contrast, these mutations continue to be used
under the random scheme. Finally, we observe that the hybrid
mode eventually outperforms all other strategies, achieving a
3.30x slowdown, however is the last mutation mode to start
reaching a plateau. We suspect that this results from the fact
the hybrid mode does not quickly penalize particular inputs
or mutations as it needs more samples of each mutation oper-
ation and oset pair before avoiding any particular oset or
mutation operation.
Instrumentation overhead. SlowFuzz’s runtime overhead,
measured in executions per second, matches the overhead of
native libFuzzer. The executions per second achieved on dif-
ferent payloads are mostly dominated by the runtimes of the
native binary, as well as the respective I/O operations. Despite
our choice to prototype SlowFuzz using libFuzzer, the design
and methodology presented in Section 3 can be applied to
any evolutionary fuzzer and can also be implemented using
Dynamic Binary Instrumentation frameworks, such as Intel’s
PIN [39], to allow for more detailed runtime tracking of the ap-
plication state. However, such frameworks are known to incur
slowdowns of more than 200%, even with minimal instrumen-
tation [43]. For instance, for our PHP hashtable experiments
described in Section 5.4, an insertion of 16 strings, resulting
in 8 collisions, takes 0.02 seconds. Running the same insertion
under a PIN tool that only counts instructions, requires a total
of ~2 seconds. By contrast, hashtable fuzzing with SlowFuzz
achieves up to 4000 execs/sec, unless a signicant slowdown
is incurred due to a particular input. 5
6 DISCUSSION
In this paper, we demonstrated that evolutionary search tech-
niques commonly used in fuzzing to nd memory safety bugs
can be adapted to nd algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities.
Similar strategies should be applicable for nding other types
of DOS attacks like battery draining, lling up memory or
hard disk, etc. Designing the tness functions and mutation
schemes for detecting such bugs will be an interesting fu-
ture research problem. Besides evolutionary techniques, using
other mechanisms like reinforcement learning or Monte Carlo
search techniques can also be adapted for nding inputs with
worst-case resource usage.
Our current prototype of SlowFuzz is completely dynamic.
However, integrating static analysis techniques into SlowFuzz
can further improve its performance. Using static analysis to
nd potentially promising osets in an input for mutation
will further reduce the search space and therefore will make
the search process more ecient. For example, using taint
tracking and loop analysis together with runtime ow proles
can identify potentially promising code locations that can
cause signicant slowdowns [41, 52].
The current prototype implementation of SlowFuzz uses
the SanitizerCoverage passes to keep track of the number of
times a CFG edge is accessed. Such tracking is limited by the
total number of buckets allowed by SanitizerCoverage. This
reduces the accuracy of resource usage information as tracked
by SlowFuzz. This results from the fact that any edge that is
accessed more than 128 times is assigned to the same bucket
regardless of the actual number of accesses. Although, under
5Execution under SlowFuzz does not require repeated loading of the required
libraries, but is only dominated by the function being tested, which is only
a fraction of the total execution of the native binary (thus smaller than 0.02
seconds).
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its current implementation, the actual edge count information
is imprecise, this is not a fundamental design limitation of
SlowFuzz but an artifact of our prototype implementation.
Alternative implementations can oer more precise tracking
can via custom callbacks for SanitizerCoverage, by adopting
hardware counters or by utilizing per-unit perf tracking. On
the other hand, the benet of the current implementation
is that it can be incorporated into libFuzzer’s main engine
orthogonally, without requiring major changes to libFuzzer’s
dependencies.
7 RELATEDWORK
Complexity attacks. Detecting and mitigating algorithmic
complexity attacks is an active eld of research. Crosby et
al. [31] were the rst to present complexity attacks abusing
collisions in hash table implementations. Contrary to Slow-
Fuzz’s approach, however, their attack required expert knowl-
edge. Since then, several lines of work have explored attacks
and defenses targeting dierent types of complexity attacks:
Cai et al. [28] leverage complexity vulnerabilities in the Linux
kernel name lookup hash tables to exploit race conditions in
the kernel access(2)/open(2) system calls, whereas Sun et
al. [54] explore complexity vulnerabilities in the name lookup
algorithm of the Linux kernel to achieve an exploitable covert
timing channel. Smith et al. [51] exploit the syntax of the
Snort IDS to perform a complexity attack resulting in slow-
downs during packet inspection. Shenoy et al. [49, 50] present
an algorithmic complexity attack against the popular Aho-
Corasick string searching algorithm and propose hardware
and software-based defenses to mitigate the worst-case perfor-
mance of their attacks. Moreover, several lines of work focus
particularly on statically detecting complexity vulnerabilities
related to regular expression matching, especially focusing on
backtracking during the matching process [25, 38, 42, 57]. Con-
trary to SlowFuzz, all the above lines of work require deep
domain-dependent knowledge and do not expand to dierent
categories of complexity vulnerabilities.
Finally, recent work by Holland et al. [34] combines static
and dynamic analysis to perform analyst-driven exploration of
Java programs to detect complexity vulnerabilities. However,
contrary to SlowFuzz, this work requires a human analyst
to closely guide the exploration process, specifying which
portions of the binary should be analyzed statically and which
dynamically as well as dening the inputs to the binary.
Performance bugs. Several prior works target generic per-
formance bugs not necessarily related to complexity vulnera-
bilities. For instance, Lu et al. study a large set of real-world
performance bugs to construct a set of rules that they use
to discover new performance bugs via hand-built checkers
integrated in the LLVM compiler infrastructure [36]. Along
the same lines, LDoctor [52] detects loop ineciencies by im-
plementing a hybrid static-dynamic program analysis that
leverages dierent loop-specic rules. Both the above lines
of work, contrary to SlowFuzz, require expert-level knowl-
edge for creating the detection rules, and are orthogonal to
the current work. Another line of work focuses on application
proling to detect performance bottlenecks. For example, Ra-
manathanet al. utilize ow proling for the ecient detection
of memory-related performance bugs in Java programs [41].
Grechanik et al. utilize a genetic-algorithm-driven proler for
detecting performance bottlenecks [48] in Web applications,
and cluster execution traces to explore dierent combinations
of the input parameter values. However, contrary to SlowFuzz,
their goal is to explore a large space of input combinations
in the context of automatic application proling and not to
detect complexity vulnerabilities.
WCET.Another related line of work addresses accurate Worst-
Case Execution Time (WCET) estimation for a given applica-
tion. Apart from static analysis and evolutionary testing ap-
proaches [26], traditionally WCET estimation has been achieved
using search based methods measuring end-to-end execution
times [55]. Moreover, Hybrid Measurement-Based Analyses
(HMBA) have been used to measure the execution times of
program segments via instrumentation points [27, 45, 46] and
execution proles [26]. Wegener et al. [56] utilize evolutionary
techniques for testing timing constraints in real-time systems,
however contrary to SlowFuzz, apply processor-level timing
measurements for their tness function and only perform ran-
dom mutations. Finally, recent techniques combine hardware
eects and loop bounds with genetic algorithms [37]. How-
ever, all of the above methods attempt to detect worst-case
execution times for simple and mostly straight-line program
segments often used in real-time systems. By contrast, Slow-
Fuzz detects algorithmic complexity attacks in large complex
programs deployed in general purpose hardware.
Evolutionary Fuzzing. Several lines of work deploy evo-
lutionary mutation-based fuzzing to target crash-inducing
bugs. Notable examples are the AFL [58], libFuzzer [14], hong-
fuzz [11], and syzkaller [23] fuzzers, as well as the CERT Basic
Fuzzing Framework (BFF) [35], which utilize coverage as their
main guidance mechanism. Moreover, several frameworks
combine coverage-based evolutionary fuzzing with symbolic
execution [29, 32, 33, 53], or with static analysis and dynamic
tainting [47] to achieve higher code coverage and increase
their eectiveness in detecting bugs. Finally, NEZHA [44] uti-
lizes evolutionary-based, mutation-assisted testing to target
semantic bugs. Although many of the aforementioned lines
of research share many common building blocks with Slow-
Fuzz, they do not target complexity vulnerabilities and mainly
utilize random mutations contrary to SlowFuzz’s targeted
mutation strategies.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work we designed SlowFuzz, the rst, to the best
of our knowledge, evolutionary-search-based framework tar-
geting algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities. We evaluated
SlowFuzz on a variety of real-world applications including
zip utilities, regular expression libraries and hash table im-
plementations. We demonstrated that SlowFuzz can success-
fully generate inputs that match the theoretical worst-case
complexity in known algorithms. We also showed that Slow-
Fuzz was successful in triggering complexity vulnerabilities
in all the applications we examined. SlowFuzz’s evolution-
ary engine and mutation strategies generated inputs causing
more than 300-times slowdown in the bzip2 decompression
routine, produced inputs triggering high numbers of colli-
sions in production-level hash table implementations, and
also generated regular expressions with exponential matching
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complexities without any knowledge about the semantics of
regular expressions. We believe our results demonstrate that
customized evolutionary search techniques present a promis-
ing direction for automated detection of not only algorithmic
complexity vulnerabilities, but also of other types of resource
exhaustion vulnerabilities, and hope to aspire tighter integra-
tion of existing techniques and static analyses with modern
mutation-based evolutionary testing.
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A WAF REGEXES
The slowdowns presented in Figure 7 correspond to inputs
matched against the following regular expressions:
Regex 1:
(?i:(j|(&#x?0*((74) |(4A)|(106) |(6A));?))
([\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|
(tab;)|( newline ;))))*(a|(&#x?0*((65)|
(41) |(97) |(61));?))([\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|
(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|( newline ;))
))*(v|(&#x?0*((86) |(56) |(118) |(76));?)
)([\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|
(tab;)|( newline ;))))*(a|(&#x?0*((65)|
(41) |(97) |(61));?))([\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|
(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|( newline ;))))*
(s|(&#x?0*((83) |(53) |(115) |(73));?))(
[\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|
(tab;)|( newline ;))))*(c|(&#x?0*((67)|
(43) |(99) |(63));?))([\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|
(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|( newline ;))))*
(r|(&#x?0*((82) |(52) |(114) |(72));?))
([\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|
(tab;)|( newline ;))))*(i|(&#x?0*((73)|
(49) |(105) |(69));?))([\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|
(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|( newline ;))))*
(p|(&#x?0*((80) |(50) |(112) |(70));?))
([\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|
(tab;)|( newline ;))))*(t|(&#x?0*((84)|
(54) |(116) |(74));?))([\t]|(&((#x?0*(9|
(13) |(10)|A|D);?)|(tab;)|( newline ;))))
*(:|(&((#x?0*((58) |(3A));?)|( colon;)
))).)
Regex 2:
<(a|abbr|acronym|address|applet|area|
audioscope|b|base|basefront|bdo|
bgsound|big|blackface|blink|
blockquote|body|bq|br|button|caption|
center|cite|code|col|colgroup|
comment|dd|del|dfn|dir|div|dl|
dt|em|embed|fieldset|fn|font|
form|frame|frameset|h1|head|hr|
html|i|iframe|ilayer|img|input|ins|
isindex|kdb|keygen|label|layer|
legend|li|limittext|link|listing|
map|marquee|menu|meta|multicol|
nobr|noembed|noframes|noscript|
nosmartquotes|object|ol|optgroup|
option|p|param|plaintext|pre|q|
rt|ruby|s|samp|script|select|
server|shadow|sidebar|small|
spacer|span|strike|strong|style|
sub|sup|table|tbody|td|textarea|
tfoot|th|thead|title|tr|tt|u|ul|
var|wbr|xml|xmp)\\W
Regex 3:
(?i: <.*[:] vmlframe .*?[ /+\t]*?src[
/+\t]*=)
14
